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and Matthew Thomas Johnson c
aDepartment of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK; bDepartment of Politics and 
International Relations, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK; cPolitics, Philosophy, and 
Religion, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to 
highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The 
gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern 
for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. 
Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or 
born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon 
the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We 
show how the pandemic has highlighted deicits in the work of four thinkers 
highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and 
Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything 
other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental 
role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.
KEYWORDS Fear; emotions; irrationality; politics; public health
Introduction
Crises, perhaps by their very nature, are highly emotive events. The COVID-19 
crisis is no exception. Within the emotional landscape of crisis, a range of feelings – 
such as anxiety, panic and dread, faith and conidence – clash and collide in 
a dynamic and uncertain social milieu. It is, however, possible to suggest that the 
threat that crises present to fundamental notions of social organization and 
behaviour generally ensures the dominance of one key emotion: fear.
The politics of fear has been subject to much theorizing. For Hobbes 
(1985), fear is a prudent motivating dynamic. It is fear of one’s fellow 
human beings that drives individuals to create social contracts capable of 
mitigating uncertainty. More recently, Judith Shklar (1989) conceptualized 
fear as the driving force behind liberalism and the achievement of a well- 
functioning liberal state. Not unlike Hobbes, she sees the role of liberal 
government as reducing fear, particularly fear related to arbitrary interference 
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in individuals’ lives by other individuals, organizations, or governments. While 
recognizing that fear itself can be a tool of oppressive social control for 
governments, she also observes that some degree of fear is unavoidable in 
human life and that any legal system implies ‘minimal levels of fear’ in order 
to incentivize compliance.
However, in the wake of the ‘afective turn’ and renewed interest in 
classical ideas of citizenship, Hobbes' and Shklar's are very much minority 
positions within political philosophy. When criticisms have been raised of the 
lack of concern for emotion in politics, more often than not, the deicit has 
been seen to relate to an inability analytically to conceive of the importance 
of ‘good’, ‘healthy’ or ‘non-masculine’ feelings. Martha Nussbaum (2018), for 
example, has presented fear as an intrinsically narcissistic emotion, antitheti-
cal to full maturity and citizenship. Indeed, the pandemic has provided prima 
facie evidence in support of this negative account of fear. Narcissistic fear may 
have been seen in mass panic buying and hoarding; at a societal level, the 
introduction of state-led social controls – i.e. lockdown and social isolation – 
has played into liberal fear of authoritarianism.
There may also, though, be reason to challenge received wisdom of the 
‘badness’ of this emotion. Fear has been central in motivating people to 
comply with the kinds of decisive public health measures necessary for 
restricting transmission of the virus (see for example, Rasmussen & 
Goodman, 2020, Ch. 12; Chon & Park, 2019). It may also have played a role 
in fomenting collective action in support of vulnerable individuals and health-
care institutions.
In this article, we use the COVID-19 crisis as a lens through which to 
evaluate paradigmatic political conceptualizations of fear, arguing that the 
crisis has highlighted their relevance but also their limitations in accounting 
for the place and purpose of the emotion. The analysis we conduct is 
grounded in answering a pragmatic question in keeping with the work of 
John Gray: to what extent are these approaches of value to human beings 
wishing to survive pandemic? We identify four emblematic approaches from 
both continental and analytical traditions that share in common belief that 
fear is, in some way, negative. First, we evaluate the common assumption that 
fear is irrational, via Martha Nussbaum’s recent work. We then consider 
Zygmunt Bauman’s claim that fear in modern society has become ‘liquid’. 
Next, we use Sara Ahmed’s work to explore the connection between fear and 
inequality. Finally, we draw on Hannah Arendt to examine the relative failure 
of some liberal-democratic governments in managing the outbreak and 
whether the associated fear may contribute to autocratization. This enables 
us to consider whether liberalism is equipped ethically to deal with fear 
stemming from radical unpredictability. We conclude that the four positions, 
despite their diferences, share deicits that suggest, in Gray’s terms, 
a tendency toward fundamentalism. We argue that, given that the 
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paradigmatic accounts we examine do not caveat their value as being 
restricted to optimal political circumstances, it is essential that their propo-
nents take seriously the practical challenges posed by COVID-19 and that 
policymakers, pragmatically, consider speciic contributions from a range of 
diferent, revised accounts in managing public responses to the crisis. This is 
a irst and early attempt to stimulate such an efort. It serves as an initial 
defence of fear. We begin by introducing Gray’s anti-fundamentalism and an 
evidential basis for the importance of circumstance on human preferences.
Pluralism and pragmatism
The COVID-19 pandemic raises a cluster of practical issues that remind us of 
both the general, animal nature of our being and the particular, human 
capacities of our species. All too often, contemporary political philosophy 
has taken for granted the material satisfaction of human needs and the 
enduring security of life within liberal democracies. This is one of the reasons 
that the work of John Gray has often appeared antiquated. Gray (1997) 
reminds us that humans have basic biological, animal and social needs that 
must be satisied if they are to do and be well (p. 58). These enduring needs 
cannot be overcome and cannot be transformed. Where progress has taken 
place, it has taken place in inding practical means of satisfying these needs 
securely and in minimizing avoidable sufering. We achieve this by develop-
ing strategies guided by values choices that respond to the particular chal-
lenges posed by our particular circumstances (Gray, 2004a, pp. 1–8, 41–48). 
These strategies can be grounded clearly in reason, but often they depend 
upon speculative ‘radical choice’ (Gray, 2000, p. 65). Vitally, though, we need 
to be pragmatic in assessing our choices against the extent to which they 
promote our enduring interests (see Gray, 2003, xi, 2002, pp. 127–128), 
seeking simply to stave ‘of disaster from day to day’ caused by short- 
sighted ‘fecklessness’ (Gray, 2004a, pp. 30–31).
The biggest threat to our survival lies in fundamentalist doctrines that 
fetishize single value sets as being uniquely and universally valuable to 
human beings irrespective of circumstance (Gray, 2003, xi–xv, 2004a, pp. 
1–8, 2004b, pp. 1–58). Gray (2000) regards liberal doctrines as being particu-
larly prone to universalism by virtue of their fetishization of liberty as non- 
interference (pp. 21, 135). This fetishization serves, not simply, to undermine 
human interests in parts of the world that are not suited to liberal-democratic 
approaches, but also inhabitants of liberal democracies themselves, who are 
denied pragmatic responses to a range of social, economic, political and 
environmental challenges. Those challenges, which include market ‘failure’ 
and climate change, constitute changes in circumstance that call for the 
deployment of diferent values as part of diferent strategies to uphold 
fundamental human interests in satisfying needs.
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Interestingly, policymakers are often surpassed by public opinion in terms 
of pragmatism. There is a great deal of evidence that experience of war leads 
to increased support for welfare provision (Obinger & Schmitt, 2019), while 
previous pandemics may have contributed to support for expanded health 
care systems (Breitnauer, 2019). During this pandemic, there has been 
increased interest in Universal Basic Income (UBI), which Nettle et al. (2020) 
suggest may be due to belief that the policy can mitigate stress associated 
with fear of destitution eiciently during pandemic. This all indicates that, as 
Nettle and Saxe (2020) have argued, that human beings’ preferences depend 
upon the weighting they assign to diferent features of policies and that that 
weighting difers as circumstance difers. ‘Thus, a policy that feels right for 
peacetime may not feel suitable for war; and, pertinently, one that feels right 
for normal times may no longer feel right for a pandemic’ (Nettle et al., 2020).
In this context, it is important to remember that fear is an evolutionary 
adaptation. Mobbs et al. (2015) outline the part it plays within 
a psychobiological Survival Optimization System (SOS) as follows:
the goal of the nervous system is to reduce surprise and optimize actions by (i) 
predicting the sensory landscape by simulating possible encounters with threat 
and selecting the appropriate pre-encounter action and (ii) prevention strate-
gies in which the organism manufactures safe environments. When a potential 
threat is encountered the (iii) threat orienting system is engaged to determine 
whether the organism ignores the stimulus or switches into a process of (iv) 
threat assessment, where the organism monitors the stimulus, weighs the 
threat value, predicts the actions of the threat, searches for safety, and guides 
behavioral actions crucial to directed escape. When under imminent attack, (v) 
defensive systems evoke fast relexive indirect escape behaviors (i.e., ight or 
light).
Fear is the emotional response to perception of threat. It is a crucial motivat-
ing dynamic that enables humans, and other species, to survive.
That perception of threat can, of course, be erroneous. Phobias are irra-
tional precisely because they identify existential threat in harmless objects, 
organisms, individuals or behaviours. A phobic response can irrational 
because the strategies it promotes are, in Gray’s terms, fundamentalist: 
unchanging even when circumstances change and when other strategies 
better promote the satisfaction of human needs. The pragmatic challenge is 
balancing rational, pragmatic and irrational, fundamentalist responses threat. 
For policymakers, this is particularly important given the potential for govern-
ment both to be phobic and to promote phobic responses among the 
populace. At base, though, Gray’s pragmatism complements behavioural 
science and, indeed, older political-philosophical accounts of the place of 
fear as a motivating dynamic, in suggesting that fear can be both natural and 
beneicial. It is clear, indeed, that the general public’s ability to perceive threat 
in COVID-19 has been beneicial to dealing with the pandemic and that, at 
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least at its height, the danger was not too much fear, but not enough of it. 
This assessment is, though, at odds with the claim that fear is irrational.
Fear and (ir)rationality
Fear is among the most viliied emotions in political scholarship (for recent 
examples see Bader et al., 2020; Furedi, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018). The only 
emotion to shoulder more blame for our political ills in recent years might be 
anger (see for example, Condit, 2018; Maskovsky & Bjork-James, 2020; 
Nussbaum, 2016). Among the most popular criticisms of fear is that it is 
irrational, and that, as a political force, it simply gets in the way of rational – 
and especially science-based responses – to crises.
Nussbaum (2018) provides one such account, claiming that fear is prone to 
a number of errors in formulation. One common source of these errors, she 
says, is ‘the availability heuristic’, a psychological concept which suggests 
that, if we experience an issue as particularly salient, we tend to overestimate 
its importance. To illustrate the relationship between fear and the availability 
heuristic, Nussbaum relates a recent incident in which the US news media 
reported that apples had been contaminated by a dangerous pesticide called 
Alar, leading people to believe that this constituted a signiicant health risk. 
Nussbaum (2018) goes on to state that, while we still are not sure about the 
health risks of Alar, ‘we certainly know by now that study, not panic, would 
have been the appropriate response’ (p. 48). It is doubtful that panic is ever an 
appropriate response to a crisis, and since both we and Nussbaum are 
actually more concerned with fear, we will maintain focus on the latter 
emotion instead.
So would fear be a rational response to news that our apples are laced with 
a carcinogen, which Alar is? The answer appears to be ‘yes’. If there were no 
reason to fear it at all, then why would anyone commission further study into 
it, and who would be driven to support it? Nussbaum’s point seems to be that 
we should not be so afraid as to alter our own day-to-day behaviour based on 
news reports about Alar, before we know whether it actually is dangerous in 
the quantities consumed by individuals. But what would be unreasonable 
about experiencing the kind of fear that makes us stop buying apples treated 
with Alar and instead start buying, say, organic apples? Nussbaum herself 
suggests that it took some time before the risks of Alar contamination were 
scientiically established. So, it is not clear why it would be more reasonable 
to wait for further study about the risks of Alar – which might take years – 
rather than to let fear drive us to another readily available option (i.e. the 
precautionary principle), while we wait for studies to be completed. 
Moreover, waiting for scientiic studies to establish that something is 
a threat as well as to ind an appropriate response to it, and to show that it 
is a greater threat than competing issues or considerations, is often not 
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option in decision-making either at an individual or governmental level. 
Indeed, in the context of the COVID-19, Western governments’ insistence 
on waiting for conclusive scientiic research, rather than acknowledging that 
the available evidence provided good reasons for fear, likely delayed and 
undermined the efectiveness of responses to the virus and contributed to 
public complacency about the outbreak. Hence, if anything, the apparent 
issue was not that government and citizens acted in fear instead of waiting 
for scientiic evidence; it was that they did not experience suicient fear in the 
face of the available evidence. This may well be a relection of an uncritical 
commitment among policymakers to the kind of liberal politics we discuss 
later on. To illustrate, the Conservative UK Government – with its concern for 
non-interference in the market – reacted much more slowly and less decisi-
vely than the Social Democratic Danish Government.
In asserting the irrationality of fear, Nussbaum (p. 48) also sets up a false 
dichotomy in public decision-making. She claims that ‘[i]n technical areas, 
there is no substitute for good and comprehensive scientiic research, but the 
public often follows fear rather than science’. But, this, irstly, fails to recog-
nize that fear and scientiic evidence can it hand in glove, and that the result 
of this pairing can be both good – e.g., more funding for research on 
treatments and vaccines for COVID-19, and people heeding government 
advice – and bad – e.g., people panic buying groceries because scientists of 
various kinds have said that this is a disaster of unimaginable proportions (see 
also Borland, 2018). Secondly, and perhaps more crucially in the present 
context, Nussbaum implies that science is a substitute for political action by 
citizens and politicians. This depoliticized picture mirrors the one painted by 
politicians in the UK and elsewhere who present themselves as vessels 
following advice experts, which is ironic given that some of the same politi-
cians, such as Michael Gove MP, were recently declaring that the public had 
had enough of experts (see Farrar, 2017). The idea that science will solve this 
crisis and that we do not have to rely on fallible politicians can be a soothing 
one, but it is also troubling, since it implies that ordinary people are them-
selves powerless to do anything about it. That should be an especially 
concerning narrative for capabilities theorists, since this suggests both 
a dystopic view of a populace incapable of autonomous thought and 
a technocratic vision of government unbending to democratic discourse. 
But, perhaps more problematically for the ‘irrational’ account of fear, there 
were various occasions in which scientists and the public appeared to share 
more accurate perceptions of threat than politicians. Scientists and those 
with scientiic training had every reason to fear COVID-19.
The narrative of fear as ‘irrational’ is particularly dangerous insofar as it 
attributes particular agency to elite scientiic actors apparently bereft of an 
ability to perceive threat. The Swedish epidemiologist Anders Tegnell’s 
admission of error in developing a relatively laissez-faire strategy has not 
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only had an impact on public faith in policy (Lindeberg & Rolander, 2020), it 
may also undermine Sweden’s strong tradition of faith in government and 
expertise. Had the Swedish government acted out of a very rational fear of 
threat to impose greater restrictions earlier, it could have saved lives. That 
would be a rational outcome driven by an emotion that has evolved precisely 
to achieve that end. Indeed, as The CDC Field Epidemiology Manual suggests, 
scientists have a role to play in deploying fear to navigate crises (Rasmussen & 
Goodman, 2020). Simply rejecting fear as irrational is, simply, irrational. The 
neglect of changing circumstances is, in fact, a hallmark of fundamentalism. 
The question should not be whether or not fear is rational, but how to 
develop policy grounded in rational deployment of the emotion when threat 
emerges.
Fear and liquidity
Many political analyses of fear, including Nussbaum’s, focus on fear primarily 
as a subjective experience, albeit obviously an experience that many indivi-
duals can experience simultaneously and toward the same object. But in 
order to understand the origins, dynamics, and uses of fear in the context 
of COVID-19, we cannot view fear as an individual experience and certainly 
not as an experience that we can reason ourselves out of at will. Fear does not 
just exist within us, but also between us, because it is, at least in part, 
a function of the unpredictability of the world around us. This challenge is 
at the heart of Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ‘liquid fear’.
‘Fear is at its most fearsome when it is difuse, scattered, unclear, unat-
tached, unanchored, free loating, with no clear address or cause’, Bauman 
suggests (2006), ‘when it haunts us with no visible rhyme or reason, when the 
menace we should be afraid of can be glimpsed everywhere but is nowhere 
to be seen’ (p. 2). He goes on to deine fear as follows:
‘Fear’ is the name that we give to our uncertainty: to our ignorance of the threat 
and what is to be done – what can and what can’t be – to stop it in its tracks – or 
to ight it back if stopping it is beyond our power. (Bauman, 2006, p. 2)
The links between Bauman’s position and the emergence of COVID-19 as 
a global pandemic are as numerous as they are obvious. But in order to forge 
a tight connection within the limits of this section, it is useful to focus on just 
three dimensions: modernity, derivatives and overload. These elements low, 
ittingly, from Bauman’s focus on liquidity, while also seeping across to ofer 
connections across and within the work of Nussbaum, Arendt and Ahmed. At 
the heart of Bauman’s position is a critique of modernity and the achieve-
ments of the Enlightenment, in the sense that the promise of science, 
rationality and state capacity had neither mastered nature nor reduced the 
sphere of blind fate. Far from bringing an end to dispute and disasters, 
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parasites and predators, modernity had, if anything, increased the range of 
‘new’ risks which were particularly pernicious exactly because of their lack of 
tangible form and the absence of obvious solutions. This has given rise to 
what Bauman terms derivative fear, a ‘state of mind’ or ‘state of being’ 
unbound from any speciic fear to exist within a certain condition of being 
uncertain and therefore afraid. In this regard, uncertainty serves as an insi-
dious form of threat particular to modern circumstance.
The transition from speciic fears to the psychological internalization of 
general fearfulness is of great signiicance for several reasons. Most clearly, the 
manner in which once an individual, group, or community has adopted 
a certain vision of the world that is implicitly based upon assumptions of 
vulnerability, distrust and danger can determine, even in the absence of 
a genuine threat, the extent to which they resort to utilization of defensive 
or aggressive ‘ight or light’ response mechanisms. The existence of ‘deriva-
tive fear’ also matters because these mechanisms may also be targeted on 
socially constructed ‘folk devils’ through complex processes of ‘othering’ that 
may, in fact, be far removed from the actual source of the issue stimulating 
fear. And yet it is exactly the unanchored and difuse nature – its innate 
liquidity – that facilitates the emergence of socially constructed and often 
politically motivated othering, ‘scapegoating’ or ‘demonization’. This, in turn, 
brings us back to the topic of rationality but serves to place it within an 
emotional context that simply acknowledges how and why feelings tend to 
trump facts (see Flinders, 2020). Once established, ‘derivative fear’ is very 
often unmoved by the existence of rational arguments that may well be 
underpinned by ‘research’, ‘data’ and ‘the latest science’ and which seek to 
assuage concern.
It is in this context that Nussbaum’s concerns about fear have particular 
salience. However, it may be that Bauman’s characterisation of modernity 
provides a framing for the source of generalized fear at odds with Nussbaum’s 
own liberal democratic intuitions and faith in progress. Bauman draws our 
attention to the way in which the modern state presents itself as having the 
capacity to manage fear by protecting citizens against unpredictable threats 
to their existence. He was undimmed in his belief that the state had largely 
failed in this regard. If anything, the state fuelled new fears while at the same 
time seeking to delegate responsibility for managing risks to the realm of the 
individual: ‘our liquid modern society is a contraption attempting to make life 
with fear liveable . . . a contraption meant to repress the potentially disarming 
and incapacitating dread of danger’ (Bauman, 2006, p. 6). This critique of the 
self-imposed limits of liberalism, clearly, runs parallel to Gray’s.
And yet hidden within Bauman’s focus on liquidity is an element that 
dovetails with his emphasis on ‘derivative fear’ and serves to contextualise 
this article’s focus on COVID-19, but which has never been articulated with 
quite the clarity it arguably deserves. That is, it is impossible to talk about the 
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‘politics of’ fear in relation to any one single event, threat or risk; or, to put the 
same point slightly diferently, COVID-19 emerged into a socio-political con-
text that was to some extent conditioned by narratives of crisis. It was fearful. 
From the global inancial crisis to a succession of epidemics (Bird Flu, SARs, 
MERs, Ebola) through to the climate change crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and 
ongoing concern regarding the vaunted ‘crisis’, ‘death’ or ‘suicide’ of democ-
racy, ‘liquid life’ appears an increasingly precarious journey in which the 
respite between fear-laden narratives of impending crisis appears increas-
ingly brief. In the UK, for example, the ‘COVID-crisis’ emerged at exactly the 
moment when the long-running ‘Brexistential angst’ appeared to be moving 
towards some form of resolution (see Clark, 2020). This, in turn, underlines 
that the ‘politics of fear’ vis-à-vis coronavirus crisis cannot be studied in 
isolation and should more accurately be conceived as being layered-upon 
or inter-woven with a complex patchwork of challenges within modern liberal 
democratic society.
Despite the insight to be gained from Bauman’s understanding of the 
politics of fear, it is weighed down by an unjustiied assumption, namely, that 
fear stems from ignorance. Bauman is not alone in presuming this. The fear/ 
ignorance coupling pervades political thought and folk psychology, such that 
it has become a truism that ignorance breeds fear. It is related but not 
identical to the claim that fear is irrational. People’s derivative fear may 
stem from a lack of knowledge of an issue, but it is a striking feature of the 
current crisis that many of our fears are not fuelled by ignorance but by 
knowledge. It was medical knowledge that made us begin to see actions, 
things, and people that we used to consider harmless as potential sources of 
a deadly virus. As Gray’s concern for circumstance, and Nettle and Saxe’s work 
on circumstantial shaping of preferences suggests, fear of the virus and its 
vectors has driven us to upend not just our own habits, but economic and 
political habits as well, demonstrating the force of knowledge-fuelled fear, 
however temporarily it may be. People are now washing their hands and 
working from home. Conservatives have turned against privatization and 
austerity. Knowledge-fuelled fear has, in some ways, made the impossible 
possible. Those who have held out against change have been dogmatic in 
ways that seem self-defeating.
Acknowledging the relationship between fear and knowledge does not 
deny the insights we have highlighted in this section. Mostly, it enriches 
them. For if modernity has generated a veritable sea of liquid fear, what 
this relationship highlights is the capacity of knowledge to crystalize fear 
around – or make it ‘stick to’ – certain issues or people. This can help us break 
habits and dogma. But it can also break people and institutions. As Mosgaard 
Andreasen (2020) highlights, the creation of knowledge that a group of 
people should be feared is central to processes of othering, and we shall 
see in the next section that knowledge has been deployed to the same end in 
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the current crisis. Yet the fear/knowledge coupling does challenge Bauman’s 
implied hierarchy of fear, according to which focused fear is less fearsome 
than liquid fear. This hierarchy might be plausible for those sheltered in ivory 
towers and gated communities, for whom circumstances may not seem 
radical to change. But it is far removed from the reality of someone who 
knows that their low-wage job exposes them to increased risk of infection or 
that people see them as culpable spreaders of disease because of the colour 
of their skin. To claim that their fears are somehow less fearsome simply 
because they are able to name the objects of their fear is patently absurd.
Fear and inequality
The discussion so far could be taken to suggest that fear and, relatedly, 
unpredictability are phenomena that afect everyone equally. The core 
assumption of political parables, such Hobbes’ state of nature, is that fear is 
universal (Hobbes, 1985; see also Davies, 2019, pp. 36–40). But fear in the 
Hobbesian state of nature cannot possibly be equal. While everyone may 
experience some fear in the state of nature, the weak have more to fear than 
the strong, the disadvantaged more than the advantaged. Early in the out-
break, the virus was often described as an equalizer. Everyone was vulnerable 
to it and therefore everyone feared it. To an extent, fear of the virus has been 
a shared experience, and it has, as we discuss in later on, facilitated solidarity 
across diferent parts of society. Yet, it quickly transpired that the virus did not 
impact everyone equally or uniformly. The elderly, the poor, and ethnic 
minorities are considerably more vulnerable to the virus than others. People 
quickly became aware of this, with the footballer, Troy Deeney, speciically 
citing increased risk of mortality as a reason for additional care (McInnes, 
2020). Hence, fear, even in a pandemic, is not equal. To help us explore the 
relationship between fear and inequality in the current crisis, we turn to the 
work of Sara Ahmed.
Ahmed’s (2014) conceptualization of the politics of fear focuses on mobi-
lity and diference. In terms of mobility, she observes, irstly, that fear itself 
mobile; it moves between ‘bodies’. Secondly, it constrains the mobility of 
some bodies, while enhancing the mobility of others. In terms of diference, 
she argues that fear is, irstly, experienced diferently by diferent bodies, and, 
secondly, that it establishes and preserves diferences in power between 
bodies (pp. 68–70). Ahmed’s central examples of these facets of fear are 
drawn from accounts of racism, islamophobia, and misogyny. In such 
instances, fear seems to establish zero-sum relationships between two 
groups, in which, although both sides might experience fear, one side gains 
power (or mobility) from it and the other loses it. These concepts have lent 
themselves particularly well to analyses of contemporary far-right move-
ments and tactics (see for example, Leser & Spissinger, 2020; Mosgaard 
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Andreasen, 2020). But they are also useful in understanding the role and 
implications of fear in the current crisis, which has, notoriously, contributed to 
a surge in racism across the world.
While COVID-19 has arguably created a situation in which all or most 
bodies, even our own, have become fearful, it has made some bodies parti-
cularly frightening. We see this, for example, in the xenophobia aimed at 
Asian people in North America and Europe, fuelled partly by President Trump 
and right-wing media referring to COVID-19 as the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Wuhan’ virus. 
The Asian-American author, Cathy Park Hong (2020), related her personal 
experiences of the surge of anti-Asian racism in the US, interspersed with 
brief, harrowing accounts of coronavirus-related attacks on Asians in the US 
and in other parts of the world, including the UK. These accounts range from 
Asians being chased with disinfectant to being spat at to being stabbed. 
A friend told Park Hong, apparently half-joking, that they were afraid to leave 
their home, not because of the virus, but because they worried about becom-
ing a victim of hate crime. ‘It doesn’t matter if our families hail from Thailand, 
Burma or the Philippines’, Park Hung remarks. ‘We don’t have coronavirus. We 
are coronavirus’ [emphasis added]. This powerfully captures Ahmed’s politics 
of fear, both in terms of diference and mobility. The coronavirus may mean 
that fear – to borrow Ahmed’s metaphor of emotional ‘stickiness’ – has stuck 
to all bodies because anyone may have it. But this fear has not simply stuck to 
Asian bodies, it has efectively permeated them; to fear the virus is to fear 
Asians. The diferential distribution of fear and the attacks it engenders 
produce the immobilizing fear expressed by Park Hong’s friend, that is, fear 
of racially motivated attacks.
Yet, experiences in the crisis also complicate Ahmed’s picture of fear. 
Because it has highlighted that marginalized groups may not simply sufer 
from fear sticking to them, but also from having fear slide of them. Again, the 
US provides an important example. Evidence shows that African Americans 
sufer more infections and more deaths than the average population (Millett 
et al., 2020). The structural inequalities sufered by members of this commu-
nity constitute or have contributed to the factors that drive this deadly 
disparity. Underlying health conditions such as asthma, diabetes and obesity 
are the most salient of them. But these inequalities also appear to contribute 
to a lack of or insuicient fear. Historical cases of medical experimentation on 
African Americans as well as present-day bias against black patients in the 
healthcare system mean that they are more likely to distrust the healthcare 
system and healthcare advice (Ebony Boulware et al., 2003). There has been 
lack of information as well as disinformation, such as claims that black people 
were immune to the disease (Breslow, 2020). As a result, fear of the virus may 
not have circulated through parts of the African American community to the 
same degree that it has in others, likely leaving members more vulnerable to 
the virus and less able to protect themselves.
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We ind a similar example in Sweden, where the government has famously 
taken a lighter-touch approach than most others. Although it is less laissez- 
faire than many people on the right have made it out to be, the Swedish 
government’s approach has been primarily advisory rather than regulatory. 
Although the relatively high number of deaths in Sweden still requires more 
substantive explanation (see Giesecke, 2020), what is clear is that several 
immigrant communities, particularly Somali Swedes, have been hit consider-
ably harder than other segments of the population. Here too, a lack of fear 
seemingly forms part of the problem. Many Somali Swedes are irst- 
generation immigrants living in ethnically homogenous enclaves in poor 
suburbs (Kerpner, 2020). Because they are less likely to speak Swedish or to 
consume Swedish language media, government advice is less likely to reach 
them, meaning that fear of the virus may not circulate as widely. Moreover, 
while most Swedes have a high level of trust in government, Somali immi-
grants come from a country where the distrust of government, for good 
reasons, runs deep. They are hence less likely to heed government advice, 
and fear of the virus may not stick. As a Somali-Swedish doctor remarked in an 
interview: ‘People just aren’t as afraid of corona. [. . .] They have experienced 
so much worse things in their native country and think that nothing as 
dangerous can happen in Sweden’ (Ferhatovich, 2020 [authors’ translation]).
That issue of cultural conceptualization of threat and faith in government 
is distinct from but may compound structural exposure to threat by virtue of 
poverty. Higher mortality rates among BAME Britons can likely be explained 
through reference to poverty and the health inequalities that result from 
choices and lifestyles imposed by resource scarcity and fear of destitution. 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, for example, suggests that economic disad-
vantages may force ethnic minorities into situations where they are at greater 
risk of exposure to the virus (Platt & Warwick, 2020). Those who work as 
cleaners, transport workers, porters and in other public-facing roles are both 
poorly paid and exposed to increased risks of contracting COVID-19. BAME 
citizens disproportionately ill these occupations. For those with low levels of 
residual wealth in a society in which social security has been diminished 
through austerity, individuals’ fear of the coronavirus is subordinated to 
fear of lost income by giving up dangerous occupations.
Understanding the role that fear has played in creating these disparities in 
mortality rates will of course require further investigation. The challenge, 
though, is to ind means of engaging speciic groups that do not experience 
suicient fear in ways that avoid marking their bodies as sources of fear for 
others. There may be ways in which highlighting exposure to unequal levels 
of risk can be a source of solidarity and reducing inequality as Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2020) hope. The danger, however, is that marking certain groups as 
needing fear serves as an extrinsic mortality cue. Behavioural science indi-
cates that, when individuals are presented with information that suggests 
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a lower level of life-expectancy, their interests are foregrounded (Nettle, 2010) 
and they make short-term decisions that undermine longer-term health 
interests and serve to compound health inequalities (Pepper & Nettle, 
2017). This is apparent in the failure of anti-smoking campaigns, which, by 
highlighting smoking-related disease, actually have a negative impact on 
smoking cessation (Adams et al., 2015). These are ‘rational’ recalibrations of 
interests borne of knowledge not ignorance – why invest more in longer-term 
goods, if they will only be realized after death? Again, this only highlights the 
ways in which, contra Nussbaum and Bauman, knowledge ought not to be 
seen as a simple antidote to irrationality and ignorance. We need, therefore, 
political responses that serve to increase people’s overall perception of life 
expectancy while highlighting particular threats to it in order to elicit fear- 
driven risk aversion. That depends upon broader structural changes within 
liberal democratic societies to ensure that some groups do not have to trade- 
of fear of death from COVID-19 of against fear of death from starvation. This 
is particularly challenging given that such reform may depend on enlarging 
the state, at a time pandemic-related fear may be undermining trust in the 
liberal-democratic state.
Fear and autocratization
Perhaps the most signiicant source of fear expressed during the twentieth 
century was that of totalitarianism. In light of fascism, communism and other 
forms of fundamentalism, there has been widespread fear that government 
can destroy people’s freedom in seeking, as in Hobbes, to reduce fear. Shklar 
(1989), for example, says ‘Systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom 
impossible’ (p. 29). On this, she was, notably, in uncharacteristic agreement 
with Arendt, a theorist best known for her conceptualization of totalitarian-
ism and political action. Arendt (2017) characterized fear as an ‘antipolitical’ 
principle, which destroys possibility for political action by citizens, which, for 
Arendt, was synonymous with freedom. According to her, the destructive 
potential of this principle was realised by totalitarian governments sustaining 
themselves through control and surveillance of people in their homes – 
dismantling the private sphere – and prohibition of unauthorized public 
gatherings – dismantling the public sphere. The result was a fear-fuelled 
loneliness diametrically opposed to the togetherness that political action 
entails (Arendt, 2017, p. 628, see also, 1998, p. 202; Lucas, 2019). This strategy 
is, of course, every bit as fundamentalist as those associated with fetishization 
of liberty as non-interference by Gray.
It is easy to see the resonances between the coronavirus crisis and Arendt’s 
account of fear and its political efects under totalitarianism. In the past few 
months, the public sphere – in both the physical and more abstract demo-
cratic sense – has narrowed markedly. Across several European countries, 
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including the UK, local or national elections were postponed or curtailed in 
some fashion (Brown et al., 2020). In the UK, Parliament closed for a month, 
limiting political debate and scrutiny of the government’s actions. Moreover, 
social distancing measures mean that protests and rallies have efectively 
become illegal. And, as in any crisis, growing calls for unity are likely to shrink 
toleration of dissent. Indeed, if the government’s characterization of its 
decision-making in the current crisis is to be believed, political debate 
would do little but impede the work of scientists. Fear of the coronavirus 
has also allowed increased government regimentation of people’s private 
sphere. Social distancing laws extended into people’s homes, limiting their 
ability to leave and barring them from having guests or, in the UK, having sex 
with chosen partners (Child, 2020). Moreover, several liberal democracies 
have introduced or plan to introduce contact tracing apps, some of which 
involve sharing not just location data but medical data without participants’ 
consent.
With some exceptions, most societies have sought pragmatically to pre-
serve enduring human interests, even at great material cost. However, among 
the negative consequences of these measures is a widespread and acute 
sense of loneliness in which fear can run rampant. Not only does the isolation 
deprive individuals of many of the external and social resources – the afec-
tive scafolding (Colombetti & Krueger, 2014) – they might ordinarily use to 
manage their fears. It also exacerbates subjective and objective powerless-
ness in the face of a crisis in which only medical experts have any real 
knowledge or control, or so the UK government has suggested.
We do not mean to suggest that fear of the coronavirus has pushed the UK 
or other Western liberal democracies into totalitarianism. But it may have 
weakened further people’s already tenuous trust in democratic institutions 
and processes (see, for example, Hansard Society, 2019). The Edelman Trust 
Barometer’s Trust and the Coronavirus (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020) 
report, which was published on 1 April and surveyed 10,000 people across 
10 countries, found that 85% of respondents agreed that ‘we need to hear 
more from the scientists and less from politicians’; 58% were concerned 
about the politicization of the crisis (‘Certain people are making the situation 
seem worse than it is for political gain’); and that scientists were trusted to tell 
the truth by 83% of those surveyed, compared to 51% who trusted their 
prime minister or president. Meanwhile, some illiberal governments, promi-
nently China, have at least given the appearance of being more efective than 
liberal ones in limiting the spread of the virus by managing fear through 
forceful regulation of both public and private spheres. These regimes are in 
efect fulilling their part of a quasi-Hobbesian social contract by protecting 
their citizens against unpredictable threats. Rather than taking the short-
comings of liberal democratic political institutions and their responses to 
the current crisis as an invitation to look for ways to strengthen them, fearful 
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citizens may well see these failings as more evidence that these institutions 
cannot be trusted (see Fukuyama, 2020). Hence, democracy may seem worth 
sacriicing in exchange for predictability. This is entirely in keeping with Nettle 
and Saxe (2020) work on preferences.
While some of the implications of fear resonate with Arendt’s analysis of 
totalitarianism, there are also key diferences. Crucially, people are continuing 
to organize politically in new and unexpected ways. We have seen fear give 
rise to courage and bonds of solidarity. The more than 750,000 people in 
England who volunteered to support the National Health Service (NHS) are 
a key example of this. Evidently, they are not engaging revolutionary political 
action, which might lead radical political theorists like Chantal Moufe (2005) 
to argue that this collectivity is not a political one. Some Arendtians may also 
contend that these people are not acting politically. After all, the action of the 
volunteers, concerted as it might be, is not giving rise to something novel and 
unexpected – often represented as the quintessence of political action in the 
Arendtian sense. Their action is simply airming an extant institution. Yet, in 
so doing, the NHS volunteers are enacting another aspect of political action 
that Arendt also emphasized: preservation (e.g., Arendt, 1998, p. 204). People 
are acting in concert for a public purpose because of fear of infection, fear of 
the impact of the virus on loved ones or fellow citizens, and fear of what it 
might mean for the NHS and its staf. While these purposes are many, an 
overarching one is quite clearly to preserve the NHS – one of the most valued 
‘public things’ (Honig, 2017) in Britain – against the threat, the fear, of 
collapse and everything that a collapse would imply for the inhabitants of 
this country. Thus, even though fear of COVID-19 has undoubtedly curtailed 
freedom in signiicant and, perhaps, necessary ways, it has certainly not left us 
unable to act politically. As Kingston (2011, p. 181) has observed, fear can 
‘reinforce a deeper sense of humanity and build new solidarities’. Indeed, 
crises can bring political opportunities (see Klein, 2020, 2007) to expand our 
political imagination and our horizon of political possibility. For example, the 
social democratic reforms that followed World War II were inconceivable 
outside of that climate of crisis and involved a great deal of intervention in 
people’s lives via programmes of nationalization and taxation. They pre-
served and expanded democracy, a fact which also contradicts the sugges-
tion that preservation of societies through fear-borne renewal is apolitical. 
The challenge, now, is for liberal-democratic governments to harness the 
potential for renewal presented by fear through reform to address the 
expanding clusters of crises without continuing the slide toward autocracy. 
This depends on fostering predictability.
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Fear and (un)predictability
The authoritarian drift of at least some parts of the liberal-democratic citi-
zenry is demonstrative of the need for predictability. Liberalism has, from the 
outset, been concerned with achieving predictability by minimizing forms of 
interference. The problem is, as Bauman notes, the liberal-democratic state 
appears increasingly incapable of achieving this. There are at least prima facie 
reasons to believe that dominant strands of liberalism are not particularly well 
equipped to address the kind of unpredictability that fosters fear that COVID- 
19 has engendered. Historically, liberalism arose out of deep frustration with 
the vestiges of feudalism (see, for example, Siedentop, 2014, pp. 265–278). 
Feudal societies imposed forms of socially and geographically impermeable 
order, in which the capacity for any action was determined by status. The de 
facto potential for arbitrary interference was great. It was often impossible to 
travel, conduct commerce, marry, or practise faith without permission from 
one’s superiors. Liberalism was, in part, borne of frustration with the capacity 
of individuals to interfere. Not only does the threat of arbitrary interference 
foster fear, as Hobbes illustrated viscerally, it also precludes the possibility of 
individuals pursuing morally signiicant ends at odds with the ends pursued 
by those with the capacity to interfere. For those liberals, like Kukathas (2003, 
p. 71), for whom non-interference is sacrosanct, if individuals are denied the 
possibility of pursuing morally signiicant ends, they are deprived of the 
possibility of living lives that they themselves value. Their lives are rendered 
meaningless. As such, liberals have regarded the attainment of non- 
interference as the structural basis of justice. As Isaiah Berlin (2002, p. 124) 
makes clear, this depends upon the state deploying interference in order to 
restrict greater interference:
Individuals are largely interdependent, and no person’s activity is so completely 
private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. ‘Freedom for the pike 
is death for the minnows’; the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of 
others.
The point, though, is that people’s preferences should and generally do 
change in response to changing circumstances. Those who fetishize non- 
interference are more likely to oppose national healthcare systems, public 
vaccination projects and forms of public guidance (see Danvers, 2020; 
Dougherty, 2020; Fishman, 2020), which are essential means of responding 
efectively to the fear of COVID-19. They are likely to view health and life as 
merely part of an individual’s conception of the good to be pursued by 
individuals (see Kristian, 2020). That looks, not just reckless, but bizarre at 
a time of pandemic.
Gray is surely right that paradigms ought to be evaluated pragmatically, 
and Hobbes that fear is a motivating force capable of leading to constructive 
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outcomes. In this instance, the shift in people’s preferences indicates that 
successful strategies lie in highlighting threat, accepting the rational experi-
ence of fear, and creating sources of security that avoid ixing fear to speciic 
bodies. Those sources of security are, actually, ones that are of value in any 
circumstance: predictable and suicient income, efective and accessible 
healthcare and policing guided by the rule of law. These are mechanisms of 
collective risk-reduction (see discussion in Morales, 2016) that are valuable in 
most or all circumstances precisely because they are essential to the satisfac-
tion of basic needs. They ought to be realized diferently, but their value is 
universal and public opinion shifts in favour of recognizing the value of the 
NHS, of UBI and of essential workers relects the honing of people’s under-
standing of their core interests while exposed to threat.
In this sense, there is need for those in public oice, prudentially or 
otherwise, to understand that COVID-19 has not only afected the framing 
of people’s perceptions, but the nature of what constitutes ‘sensible’ public 
policy. Autocratic governments appear to have presented clear responses to 
the shifts in circumstance. Those, such as Lukaschenko in Belarus, who have 
not responded adequately to fear have lost legitimacy. Liberal democracies 
need to ensure that they do not follow suit by fetishizing, for example, non- 
interference in taxation of those with the capacity to support the public 
purse.
Conclusion
According to Shklar (1989), ‘when we think politically, we are afraid not only 
for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well’ (p. 29). In this paper, we have 
taken this invitation to re-think our understanding of the politics of fear. 
Drawing on the work of Gray and those who view fear as an adaptive 
motivating dynamic, we have shown that COVID-19 radically unsettles several 
key characterizations of fear in politics. The present crisis stimulates fear of 
disease and of our fellow citizens for good reasons. Contra Nussbaum, fear 
can be both rational and, contra Bauman, borne of knowledge, rather than 
ignorance. Ahmed helps us see that structural inequality, which has only been 
exacerbated by the clusters of crises and poorly managed responses in recent 
years, means that fear is experienced unequally during pandemic. But what 
she fails to grasp is the qualiied importance of fear politically; efective 
responses to COVID-19 may simultaneously require speciic groups to experi-
ence ever greater fear of disease while at the same time being aware that 
eforts to achieve that may actually be self-defeating.
Perhaps the most hopeful means of responding to these distinct, but related, 
challenges may lie in pursuing resilient forms of non-interference via expansion 
of social security. Again, though, any such attempts run the risk of enhancing 
existing processes of autocratization and are themselves liable to elicit fear of 
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interference via taxation among particular groups. The broader point in examin-
ing the approaches above, though, is that for too long citizens of liberal democ-
racies have overlooked the importance of predictability. Too often, people have 
bemoaned the dull predictability of their lives. Facing the possibility of intubation 
and death is really not the unpredictability that bored Westerners had in mind. 
Yet, this should remind us that the opposite to dull predictability can just as well 
be terrifying unpredictability as it can be a new relationship, a lottery win or 
a new job. This is where liberal-democratic processes appear to be falling behind 
autocracies, and, with the public primed to airm normality, this is an opportu-
nity for liberal democracies to renew social contracts with reference to achieving 
security through policies that promote equality. Failing to do that not only leaves 
signiicant parts of the populace open to increased rates of mortality due to 
inequalities in social determinants of health, it also deprives society of the 
capacity to manage fear in governance.
The examination of key paradigmatic approaches above highlights the 
ways in which settled approaches to fear have been challenged and under-
mined by COVID-19. It also suggests that efective deployment of the politics 
of fear depends upon transcending paradigms in light of the new normal and 
integrating them efectively into the policymaking process.
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